Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology. Rudolph Carnap. [In this essay Carnap is concerned with the question of the “reality” of the sorts of what he calls “abstract. Rudolf Carnap’s article “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” deals with the implications of accepting language which refers to abstract entities. Empiricists. Carnap, “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology”. Major Premise: Accepting the existence abstract entities involves a pragmatic decision to use a certain linguistic.

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Rudolf Carnap, Empiricism, semantics, and ontology – PhilPapers

But it can be freed of this association But, Carnap warns, it concerns a matter of degree, and a formulation in the form “real or not? The qnd of three spatial coordinates is not forced on us, but is strongly suggested by common observation. Internal Realism in Metaphysics.

Can Semantics Guide Ontology? Some of the criticisms by English philosophers against such references give the impression that, probably due to the misinterpretation just indicated, they accuse the semanticist not so much of bad metaphysics as some nominalists would do but of bad psychology.

Therefore the introduction of such constants is not to be regarded as an essential step in the introduction of the framework. Sign in Create an account. But they are not names, there are no entities designated by them.

It is important to notice that the system of rules for the linguistic expressions of the propositional framework of which only a few rules have here been briefly indicated is sufficient for the introduction of the framework. This evaluation is usually carried out, of course, as a matter of habit rather than a deliberate, rational procedure. Carnap provides the following example of this problem of proof: The physical state of a space-time point is described either with the help of qualitative predicates, such as ‘hot’, or by ascribing numbers as values of a physical magnitude such as mass, temperature, etc.


Andrew Higgins – manuscript. Many philosophers regard a question of this kind as an ontological question which must be raised and answered before the introduction of the new language forms. Suppose that one philosopher says: To be real in the scientific sense means to be an element of the system; hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself.

Internal–external distinction

Therefore I feel compelled to regard the external question as a pseudo-question, until both parties to the controversy offer a common interpretation of the question as a cognitive question; this would involve an indication of possible evidence regarded as relevant by both sides. Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.

The more ‘fundamental’ model is, for such engineering, superfluous. In other words, Quine’s position is that “Carnap’s main objection to metaphysics rests on an unsupported premise, namely the assumption that there is some sort of principled plurality in language which blocks Quine’s move to homogenize the existential quantifier.

Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology

Shamik Dasgupta – – Philosophical Review 3: The system of things only had extended objects with spatial and temporal carmap between them. In other words, Hirsch agrees with Quine that there is an overarching language that we can adapt to different situations. They are doing their own job. The system of thing properties The thing language otology words like “red,” “hard,” “stone,” “house,” etc. Unless and until they supply a clear ontollogy interpretation, we are justified in our suspicion that their question is a pseudo-question, that is, one disguised in the form of a theoretical question while in fact it is a non-theoretical; in the present case it is the practical problem whether or not to incorporate into the language the new linguistic forms which constitute the framework of numbers.


As far as it is a principle of accepting certain entities and not accepting others, leaving aside any ontological, phenomenalistic and nominalistic pseudo-statements, there cannot be any theoretical objection to it.

Others object, claiming that this designation violates the basic principle of empiricism and leads back to a metaphysical ontology of the platonic kind. However, we have seen that the external question ojtology not a theoretical question but rather the practical question whether or not to accept those linguistic forms. Let us now summarize the essential characteristics of situations involving the introduction of a new kind of entities, characteristics which are common to the various examples outlined above.

The Role of Mathematics in Physical Sciences: The acceptance of new linguistic forms cannot be judged as being either true or false, since it is not an assertion, rather it can only be judged as being more or less expedient than with prior forms.

Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology

It is obvious that the apparent negation of a pseudo-statement must also be a pseudo-statement. Thus, in this view, the Carnapian multiplicity of possible linguistic frameworks proposes a variety of ‘realities’ and the prospect of choosing between them, a form of what is called ontological pluralismor multiple realities.

From these new language forms, one can formulate internal empirical or logical questions and possible answers to them.