Which of the following is NOT part of an argument for eliminative materialism? a. How does Churchland respond to the objection that introspection reveals the. Eliminative Materialism. Paul Churchland. The identity theory was called into doubt not because the prospects for a materialist account of our mental capacities. Paul M. Churchland; Published Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at.
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Sign in Create an account. Summary Eliminative materialism is a revisionary view in the philosophy of mind and of cognitive science, according to which our ordinary, folk psychological notions and categories of mental states are empty, that is, they do not stand for anything in objective reality. Ordinary categories of mental states include propositional attitudes such as belief, desire, fear and phenomenal states such as the subjective aspect of pain, pleasure, colour perception, etc.
The main point of eliminative materialism is that categorization of mental states according to our ordinary, everyday understanding is illegitimate, because it is not supported by the best scientific taxonomies that deal with mental life, such as neuroscience. Some eliminative materialist authors add the further claim that churclhand neuroscience will in fact eliminate all non-scientific vocabulary related to the domain of mental states.
Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes – Semantic Scholar
Key works Early formulations of the view are due to Quine and Feyerabend Rorty was the first influential and elaborate statement and endorsement of the view, later dubbed as “eliminative materialism” by Cornman Its version that attacks propositional attitudes have been elaborated by ChurchlandChurchlandChurchlandand Stich The literature that is critical of the view is considerable.
Eliminativism about Consciousness 29 Eliminativism about Qualia 52 Eliminativism about Propositional Attitudes Connectionism and Eliminativism 23 Philosophy of Psychology 14, 10, Jobs in this area. Options 1 filter applied. Using PhilPapers from home? Create an account to enable off-campus access through your institution’s proxy server.
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it: Add an entry to this list: This paper starts from the familiar premise that psychological anti-individualism is incompatible with materialism. It attempts to state more clearly what this incompatibility consists in, and — rather than arguing in detail for any particular resolution — to inquire whether this incompatibility admits any resolution.
However, the paper does offer a conditional argument concerning the possibility that the incompatibility is genuine and cannot be resolved. Provided that anti-individualism and materialism cannot be squared, and anti-individualism is correct, it follows that materialism If so, the situation is not as disastrous as it might at first seem.
We need not, in consequence of our inability to construe a coherent metaphysics of mind, give up on intentional vocabulary any more than we must stop, in consequence of our inability to make sense of induction, anticipating the future. Eliminative Materialism in Philosophy of Mind.
Naturalism and Intentionality in Philosophy of Mind. Varieties of Content Externalism in Philosophy of Mind. Encyclopedia article briefly summarizing the history of atomism from antiquity to modernity. Atomists in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy. Chemical Atomism in Philosophy of Physical Science. Logical Atomism in Metaphysics. Richard Rorty in 20th Century Philosophy. Causal Closure of the Physical in Metaphysics. Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content in Philosophy of Mind. Functionalism, Misc in Philosophy of Mind.
Mental States and Processes in Philosophy of Mind. Metaphysics of Mind, Misc in Philosophy of Mind. Nonreductive Materialism in Philosophy of Mind. Philosophy of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind. The Exclusion Problem in Philosophy of Mind.
In a number of influential papers, Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich have presented a powerful critique of so-called arguments from reference, arguments that assume that a particular theory of reference is correct in order churchlnd establish a substantive conclusion.
The critique is that, due to cross-cultural variation in semantic intuitions supposedly undermining katerialism standard methodology for theorising about reference, the assumption that a theory of reference is correct is unjustified. I churcyland that the many extant responses to Machery et al. I then argue that it can in principle be justified by an appeal to Carnapian explication.
I show how to apply the explication defence to arguments from reference given by Andreasen and by Churchland. Philosophy of Language in 20th Century Philosophy.
Conceptual Engineering in Metaphilosophy. Theories of Reference, Misc in Philosophy of Language. Reductionism in General Philosophy of Science. Physicalism eliminativw the Mind in Philosophy of Mind. Chuchland purpose here is to undercut rorty’s critique of “the privacy objection” to the mind-body identity theory. Patricia Churchland’s Neurophilosophy argues for Eliminative Materialism, but it is vulnerable to criticism under the following heads: Metaphysics of Mind in Philosophy of Mind.
Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Philosophy of Psychology in Philosophy of Cognitive Science. A brief examination of some of the traditional dualistic views on the relationship of the mind and body reveals significant problems, especially regarding causal interaction.
Our common sense, conceptual framework concerning the materialosm and prediction of human behavior is construed as a theory, termed folk psychology. This theory is evaluated relative to a proposed competing theory which comes from the neurosciences, according to a variety of well accepted criteria, and found to be deficient.
The relationship of folk psychology to dualism Its relationship to folk psychology is explicated by the drawing of a distinction between weak and strong ontic commitments. Weak ontic commitments involve the types-of-things countenanced by some theory. Strong ontic commitments involve such ultimate types as mental or physical.
Both psychoneural and psychofunctional reductivism are examined. This view is examined in relationship to the network theory of meaning, to the view that perception is theory-laden, and to the identity theory. The major problem facing the eliminative materialist is to account for the qualitative churchladn of perceptual experience. It is maintained that elliminative a dualistic folk psychology and eliminative materialism are best construed as paradigms.
Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes
These paradigms are summarized and used to resolve some of the contemporary disputes between materialists and proponents of folk psychology. Thus, the proposed alternative to the theory of folk psychology is better termed ‘eliminative neuroscience’. This paper considers how best an eliminativist eliminatve argue for the radical falsity of commonsense psychology.
The eliminativist needs to argue that the representations that feed into action are fundamentally different from those invoked by propositional attitude psychology.
The paper considers a number of examples of how this eliminativist strategy might be developed, ranging from the implications of the two visual systems hypothesis to research in social psychology into the role that situational factors play in controlling action.
A critique of two eliminative positions in philosophy of mind in the light of Michael Polanyi’s account of mind: Rorty’s disappearance theory and Churchland’s eliminative materialism. I conclude the paper by claiming that given that pragmatism is in fact supportive of a specific variety of metaphysics, the relationship between idealism and pragmatism ought to be seen as involving more convergence rather than great contestation.
American Philosophy, Misc in Philosophy of the Americas. American Pragmatism in Philosophy of the Americas. Realism and Anti-Realism in Metaphysics. Wittgenstein has killed it. At least with Dennett, Carruthers, Churchland etc one gets a breath As W showed so beautifully, the confusions that lead to metaphysics are universal and nearly inescapable aspects of our psychology.
They occur not only in all thinking on behavior but throughout science as well. Since it is pointless to waste time deconstructing Shoemaker line by line, showing the same errors over and over, I will describe some facts about how our psychology language works and with this outline and the references I give it is quite straightforward to give a meaningful description of the cchurchland in place of the metaphysical fantasies.
elkminative If I were to debate Shoemaker we would never get beyond the title. Anomalous Monism in Philosophy of Mind. Metaphysical Naturalism in Metaphysics. It revolves around the idea that reduction between theoretical levels is a matter of degree, and can be laid out on a continuum between a “smooth” pole theoretical identity and a “bumpy” pole extremely revisionary. It also entails that both higher and lower levels of the reductive relationship sustain some degree of explanatory autonomy.
The new wave predicts that However, the model has conceptual problems which preclude its success in reviving reductionism, and its commitment to a syntactic approach wrecks its attempt to rescue folk psychology.
Elimiantive, the architecture of the continuum operates on a category mistake that sneaks in an eliminativist conclusion. I argue that new wave reductionism therefore tends to be eliminativism in disguise.
Psychophysical Reduction, Misc in Philosophy of Mind. Reduction, Misc in General Philosophy of Science. Theory Change in General Philosophy of Science. Theory Reduction in General Philosophy of Science. However, people unfamiliar with philosophy and cognitive science do know all those things. The skeptical argument is traditional in form: So I call the resulting skepticism Live Skepticism. Furthermore, the scope of Live Skepticism is bizarre: Disagreement in Philosophy in Metaphilosophy.