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This paper seeks to contribute to the ongoing controversy on the distributional effects of structural reforms in developing countries. To this end, we set up a small-scale macroeconomic model of a dual economy to capture the transmission mechanisms through which the deregulation of product and factor markets, the liberalization of the trade and FDI regime, and the privatization of public companies impact on the distribution of employment and wages between the formal and the informal sector.
We empirically test the implications of our theoretical model in a detailed case study on the structural reform process in Bolivia since Rigidities in product and labor markets are considered to be at the root of poor economic performance in many developing countries. To achieve sustainable economic growth, international organizations, such as IMF and World Bank, and bilateral donors have advocated strict stabilization programs followed by comprehensive and far-reaching structural reforms.
There is widespread consensus that these policy measures contribute to creating a favorable economic environment by restoring macroeconomic and fiscal stability. Critics, however, argue that rising inequality is also part of the package. In this paper, we assess the validity of this claim focusing on the impact of structural reforms on the distribution of wages and employment between the formal and informal sector. In Section 2, we set up a small-scale macroeconomic model of a dual economy.
The formal sector is modeled with a monopolistically competitive firms, b union-firm bargaining, c efficiency wage setting, and d employment protection. The impact of market imperfections on the labor-market equilibrium has long been discussed in the literature.
More recently, the focus has shifted towards their interactions. The link between union-firm bargaining and efficiency wages as complementary theories to explain sectoral wage differentials was explored by Garino and Martin By integrating all four types of market imperfections into a single model, we intend to proceed further on this path. We then apply the model to capture the different transmission mechanisms through which structural reforms impact on wages and employment in the formal and informal sector.
Following Blanchard and Giavazziwe introduce structural reforms in a highly abstract fashion by discussing their impact on the model parameters which reflect the above mentioned market imperfections. Due to the complexity of this issue, we argue that the most promising approach to gain further insights into the distributional effects of structural reforms is to carry out detailed country case studies.
In this paper, Bolivia is chosen as object of analysis because it has blivia comprehensive and far-reaching structural reforms in a stable economic environment without bilivia major exogenous shocks. We start this exercise in Section 3 by giving an overview of the structural reforms undertaken in Bolivia since Feeding the Bolivian structural reform process into our small-scale macroeconomic model, we then derive hypotheses on the post-reform trends in the distribution of wages and employment between the formal and informal sector.
Building upon Moensted and Carneiro and Henleywe empirically test these hypotheses in Section 4 by estimating the formal employment share and by applying the decomposition methodology proposed by Oaxaca and Ransom to isolate the rent component of the formal wage.
The data for the empirical analysis comes from seven biennial multi-purpose household surveys of the years to We finally summarize our theoretical and empirical findings and derive some policy conclusions in Section 5. In order to capture the transmission mechanisms through which structural reforms impact on the distribution of wages and employment between the formal and informal sector, we set up a small-scale macroeconomic model of a dual economy see Figure 1.
The market structure of the informal sector, which produces the traditional good T, is perfectly competitive. In the formal sector, J monopolistically competitive firms produce J imperfectly substitutable varieties of the modern good M.
On the first stage of the utility maximization problem, individual solves. The household loves variety in the modern sector and derives utility from J varieties of the modern good according to the CES utility function. Maximizing utility subject to the budget constraint and aggregating over all households yields the demand for variety j. The output of variety j depends on the number of production workers L v Mjeffort E j and the level of technology A j and is given by.
Effort is a function of the wage paid by bklivia j W Mj relative to the expected outside wage Z. Following Summers boliviaa, we assume. Additionally, firm j’s workforce consists of L f Mj non-production workers, who are assumed to receive the same wage as production workers.
Maximizing firm j’s profits subject to its demand function 4 implies that firms can set prices as a markup on marginal costs. In the informal sector, labor productivity of workforce L T is constant and normalized to one, i.
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In perfectly competitive product markets, prices are set equal to marginal costs, which implies. The economy is populated with L homogeneous and risk-neutral workers who supply labor inelastically. In the informal sector, the labor market boolivia atomistic, whereas in the formal sector, wages result from negotiations between unions 1 and firms.
This assumption can be justified on the grounds that rents only accrue in the monopolistically competitive formal sector. The wage bargaining takes place in a right-to-manage set-up, 2 where each firm negotiates with a single in-house union at the end of each period. The negotiation partners’ stake in the boluvia bargaining is the difference in payoffs between leu situation with and without an agreement. Both negotiation partners gain a positive rent’- the firm because of its market power in the product market, and the union because of its market power in the labor market.
Union j boluvia assumed to represent only firm j’s production workers. Upon successful completion of the negotiations, union j gains a rent of.
Firm j’s stake in the wage bargaining is equal to its variable profits. Assuming an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, the wage is set to maximize the geometric average of the negotiation partners’ rents from reaching an agreement. We assume that after the wage bargaining is completed at the end of period t-1, all jobs in the formal sector are newly allocated.
Union members hereafter referred to as insiders who are not re-employed by their former employer expect either to find employment in bolifia the other J-1 formal firms at the average formal wage W M or to have to work in the informal sector at W T.
The expected outside wage is, thus, given by where prob L Mt Bloivia Mt-1 is insiders’ transition rate into formal employment. Due to sector-specific human capital and employment protection, it is reasonable to argue that the boliia of ldy to work in the informal sector in period t is not blivia for all workers, but dependent on their sectoral affiliation in period t More specifically, we assume that insiders enjoy a higher transition rate into formal employment than workers who were informally employed in period t-1, i.
In this model specification, the expected outside wage of insiders is given by. We consider a symmetric equilibrium of a closed economy, in which all individuals have identical preferences, and in which union bargaining power, the efficiency wage parameter, the level of technology and the number of 0274 workers are equal for all formal firms.
The labor-market equilibrium depends on five model parameters: Higher wages in the formal sector feed into higher prices of, and lower demand for the modern good.
The efficiency wage parameter g enters the model in two ways. If efficiency wage setting and union-firm bargaining coexist, i. As a result, firms are more willing to make concessions in wage negotiations and unions can push harder for a pay rise.
For the reasons discussed above, the reverse holds true for the employment share of the formal sector.
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Both parameters work through their effect on the expected outside wage. Having characterized the comparative statics of the model, we can now turn to the distributional effects of structural reforms. The policy reforms can be grouped into five categories: Following Blanchard and Giavazzithese reforms are introduced in a highly abstract fashion. In the first step of the analysis, we discuss their impact on the model parameters h, b, g, y, and m see Matrix A of Figure 3.
Linking the outcome of this exercise to the comparative statics of Section 2. Product-market deregulation comprises domestic policy reforms which increase the degree of competition in the formal sector.
Labor-market deregulation has an impact on two model parameters. Formally speaking, the model depicts a closed economy.
Yet, it is still suitable to analyze the distributional effects of the liberalization of the trade and FDI regime. Assuming that the production of tradable goods and the inflow of foreign capital is concentrated in the formal sector, opening up the economy – be it via international trade or via foreign direct investment – should affect three model parameters.
Depending on the degree to which imports replace local production and to which foreign direct investors crowd out local competitors, demand for goods produced in the formal sector either rises or falls. Introducing privatization of public companies into the model is even more complex. First, the impact of privatization on the degree of competition bolivua product markets h is undetermined. On the one hand, Haskel and Szymanski argue that a shift from public to private ownership changes the 2704 function of the privatized entity.
Public companies are thought to pursue the interests of all stakeholders, i.
Consequently, private firms are more likely to abuse market power than public companies. On the other hand, privatization is often accompanied by product-market deregulation. This is done by substituting competitive market structures for state monopolies and by phasing out other types of administrative interference in the market. Furthermore, when balancing the 2704 of consumers and producers, regulators tend to favor producers in the case of public companies, but booivia in the case of private firms.
Hence, antitrust rules tend to be more strictly enforced after privatization.
Second, privatization often goes hand in hand with de-unionization and the weakening of job security. Both union density and co-determination are usually higher in public companies than in private firms. While lej companies tend to base remuneration and dismissal protection mainly on the principle of seniority, private companies are more likely to use a carrot-and-stick approach.
Bolovia the one hand, they offer performance-related pay and fast-track careers for high achievers. On the other hand, they monitor closely to prevent shirking. In other words, the efficiency wage parameter y should increase.
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Referring to these results, we can now derive the distributional effects of structural reforms see Matrix C of Figure 3. Only in the case of the deregulation – be it in the product markets or in the labor markets – is the outcome clear-cut in that it causes an expansion of the formal employment share and a 20744 in the rent component of the formal wage, either via an increase in the degree of competition, or via a decrease in union bargaining power ldy insiders’ transition advantage.
The distributional effects of the liberalization of the trade and FDI regime and of the privatization of 20744 companies, however, are a priori undetermined golivia depend on lley strength of the different transmission mechanisms.
In our view, the complexity of the distributional effects suggests this issue be explored further in detailed country case studies. We choose Bolivia as object of analysis for two reasons: Compared to other Latin American bolivka, Bolivia has a often been regarded as a “star reformer”, and b enjoyed a period of economic stability without major exogenous shocks during and after the implementation of the structural reforms.
Therefore, volivia expect that the structural reforms are the major driving force behind the trends in the distribution of wages and employment between the formal and informal sector in Bolivia. We start this exercise by giving an overview of the structural reforms undertaken in Bolivia since Structural Reforms in Bolivia: In order to overcome the economic crisis, the new president Victor Paz Estensoro performed a radical policy change in He first implemented a strict stabilization program, which enabled Bolivia to quickly regain its internal and external macroeconomic equilibrium.
Its objective was to restore sustainable economic growth as well as to enhance the allocative efficiency and international competitiveness of product and factor markets by replacing the out-dated development model based on market protection and state interventions by a free-market approach.
By deregulation of product markets we mean domestic policy reforms which aim at promoting efficiency and competition in the economy and at creating a “level playing field” for all market participants.